Reflections on the Dawn of Consciousness, 4


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4

Consciousness ... and the Bicameral Mind

Marcel Kuijsten

95-140


p. 96 are language-conventionalities and notational conventionalities useful to mortals by being productive of humble piety in the face of the prospect of divine grace, or are they misguiding misleads into disruptive calamity in store for the straying soul heedlessly wandring out away from the protective pale/palisade of divine grace?

"Consciousness is not all language, but is generated by it and is accessed by it." (Jaynes 1990, p. 449. See also Jaynes 1976, pp. 48-66)

{It could better (and especially more realistically) be asserted that the interference exerted against the subsistence of consciousness is "not all language, but is generated by it and is accessed by it." [written 15 June 2017]}

[quoted from Damasio 1999, p. 188] "When thinkers as diverse as Daniel Dennett, Humberto Maturano, and Francisco Varela speak about consciousness, they usually refer to consciousness as a post-language phenomenon."

{Such misguiding pseudo-metaphysicists are therewith being deliberately deceitful, or are themselves grievously deluded -- or else a most baneful combination of the twain.}

Jaynes 1990 = Julian Jaynes : "Verbal Hallucinations and Pre-Conscious Mentality". In :- M. Spitzer & B. Mahler (edd.) : Philosophy and Psychopathology. Springer Verlag.

Damasio 1999 [though not infra p. 136 in "REFERENCES"] = Antonio R. Damasio : The Feeling Of What Happens : Body And Emotion In The Making Of Consciousness. NY : Harcourt Brace, 1999. https://www.worldcat.org/title/feeling-of-what-happens-body-and-emotion-in-the-making-of-consciousness/oclc/318244941/viewport N.B. However, Damasio promptly neatly negateth Julian Jaynes hypothesis of total "unconsciousness" of animals : to wit, by Damasio's adding (loc. cit.) his own "proposal" that animals have always been controlled by an innate "core consciousness" of their own : thusly, [quotation :] "extended consciousness rides on top of the foundational core consciousness which we and other species have long had and continue to have." [There is, in contrast, such a mental potential as "unconscious memory" (G&J:AIT, p. 214), also known as (G&J:AIT, p. 215) "procedural" or "implicit memory."] {Apart from Julian Jaynes himself, it would appear that no university-associated author would currently claim that animals are utterly unconscious, entirely lacking any emotion, any sensation, any perception, nor having anything else of that ilk. That notion of Jaynes's is a bye-now-obsolete long-since-discarded notion, upheld only by the intransigent fanatic Jaynesians themselves. The notion of animal-nonconsciousness was, however, widely entertained in the 19th century Chr.Aira; and, Julian Jaynes remained throughout his lifespan an arch-conservative : "His values often seemed of the 19th century" (W.R.W. : "Julian Jaynes", supra p. 60).}

G&J:AIT = Temple Grandin & Catherine Johnson : Animals in Translation. originally published NY : Scribner, 2005.


{As, calling consciousness "the mind", one wrote one commentator (5B:"DBRBBN") on Descartes' Error : "So the error Descartes made was ... the idea that the mind can exist without the ... emotional ... ." Existence of consciousness is entirely made possible by emotion : so that (as explained, calling consciousness "reasoning", another commentator on Descartes' Error -- LTh:"DEER") "unconscious feelings ("background feelings")" derived from emotions are necessary to consciousness; and (as wrote, calling consciousness "the self", another commentator on the same book -- loc. cit.) "the self, broadly understood, is predicated upon emotions/feelings as defined by Damasio ... Does not cite Julian Jaynes but would be curious to read of the extent to which these very different theories are compatible or contradictory."

Our characterization of the extent to which these very different theories are {in}compatible or contradictory" : Consciousness, as a function of emotion and of sentiment, is constantly being restricted and limited by (dampened and squelched by) being bombarded by interference from usage of mere language, which can be nothing more than a jumble of arbitrary symbols having no signification in-and-of themselves. The feeble and meagre objects which we designate as "words" tend by their very existence to dilute, and therewith to detract from the rich fullness of our fullsomely significant emotion-and-sentiment. [written 15 June 2017]}

5B:"DBRBBN" = "David Brooks Recommends the Best Books on Neuroscience". http://fivebooks.com/interview/david-brooks-on-neuroscience/

LTh:"DEER" = "Descartes' Error : Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain by Antonio Damasio".


p. 97 but is the brain-hemiphaire which is not in control of the bodily motor-activities whih involve in language-communication expressions truly non-conscious, or is it actually conscious even though not linguistically communicative?

"Bridgeman [2003, p. 248] ... points out the interesting fact that studies of split-brain patients -- who have had the connection between the two brain hemispheres severed ... -- are completely aware of directions or stimuli ..., yet lack any conscious awareness ... . While the ... information is outside their awareness, they can understand it and act on it. When they do, the actions initiated by their right hemisphere feel as though someone else is performing activities in their body.

... patients only have consciousness awareness of things presented to their dominant hemisphere for language."

{This is a logically illegitimate (and thus, inadmissible) deduction. From the fact that their language-controlling brain-hemisphaire is describing such "actions initiated" as of the not-self, it cannot be be deduced that the non-language-controlling brain-hemisphaire is non-conscious, but, instead, it more strictly can be deduced that, although indeed conscious, it logically cannot (viz., cannot by means of language) convey the fact that it is thoroughly conscious.}

Bridgeman 2003 = Bruce Bridgeman : Psychology and Evolution : the Origins of Mind.


p. 98 are "languages" somehow magically restricted to exclusively humans?!

"acquiring a human language (an oral or sign language) is a necessary condition for consciousness". {If so, programming a computer must confer consciousness on it!}

{Bird-species have their oral languages, expressed in their calls; and bees have their sign-languages, expressed in their dances.}


p. 98 linguistic-jargon notions quoted (approvingly!) from Daniel Dennett (in EFI 2005)

"non-human animals and pre-linguistic children... are not really conscious ... : {Really not? according to whose "authority"? The slaughterhouse-owner's authority??}

{[quoted from G&J:AIT, p. 262] "animals are conscious, too. ... We know they have constant mental activity of some kind, because their EEGs aren't that different from ours. ... the content of their consciousness is mostly pictures and ... sounds., too. Animals ... even have conscious "thoughts" of smells, touch, or taste."}

there is no organized subject ... to be the enjoyer or sufferer, {But .. since when did mere grammar dictate praesence or absence or consciousness?! Is consciousness truly altogether unrelated to sensation, perception, etc etc?}

{What this must mean [for, it could hardly support another meaning] is that there is no --

grammatical subject of a syntactically organized sentence in their mentally concentrated attention; despite the (nongrammatical, nonsyntactical) fact that they, in their mentally concentrated attention, certainly do "enjoy and suffer" a wide variety of sensations.}

no owner of the experiences ... ." {Since when did the mere legalistic fiction of so-called "ownership" dictate praesence or absence or consciousness?! Is the author so culture-bound as to reject out-of-hand all human (and/ or other) values not based so very (even ludicrously so, we might say) strictly upon the wholly artificial and arbitrary notion of "ownership"?}

{What this must mean is that there is no word /owner/ in animals' own vocabulary, despite their very definite considering themselves owners of numerous things, such as their own food, their own territory, etc etc, and will contend against another animal who may be challenging this sense of ownership. Furthermore, by the same token, a monk or a nun who hath taken a vow of poverty would not be considered to own so much as food nor territory; and therefore, by Dennett's (and, by implication, Kuijsten's) criteria, must be very much less conscious than all "non-human animals and pre-linguistic children"!}

EFI = Edge Foundation Inc http://www.edge.org/q2005/q05_10.html

G&J:AIT = Temple Grandin & Catherine Johnson : Animals In Translation : Using the Mysteries of Autism to Decode Animal Behavior.originally published NY : Scribner, 2005. (reprint : Harcourt Books, Orlando (FL), 2006)


{While an ordinary adult human is merely perceiving scenes (accompanied with aisthetic enjoyment of them) without, however, running through his or her mind words and sentences describing the scenes perceived; then at that time such adult human must be "unconscious", according to D.D.'s & M.K.'s & Julian Jaynes' quite idiosyncratic definition of the word "conscious". It is merely on his arbitrary choice of an idiosyncratic definition (instead of being contented with the commonplace colloquial definition) for the words "conscious" and "consciousness", that any such arbitrary description of human evolution is based. [But certain other notorious psychologists (such as, Sigmund Freud) have based their sensationalist "theories" on even flimsier grounds. Would, mayhap, Julian Jaynes be asserting his vaunted "authority" as university-professor of psychology (as if psychology were a reputable science!) to conjecture (and neologously invent neologisms in meanings of words) as wildly as any wandering whim of his might arbitrarily lead him?!]}


p. 99 "unable"; or, too timid?

"He seemed completely literal -- unable to juggle hypotheses or possibilities, unable to enter an imaginative ... realm."

{All-too-litteral-minded psychologists too often take indications altogether too shallowly, mistaking merely shy timidness on the part of one-or-more of their subject-patients for gross inability. If they find one of their subject-patients unwilling (out of sheer timidity) to hypothesize in an "imaginative" (i.e., reckless) fashion, psychologists are inclined to regard (quite without cause) that person as demented, rather than as cautious and conservative (which may in actuality be the case). [written 11 June 2017]}


p. 100 real or feigned?

"Jaynes draws clear parallels between the auditory hallucinations of modern schizophrenics and those that governed ancient civilizations."

{This parallel is totally irrealistic. The royalty of high antiquity used to feign hearing voices of deities in the same insincere fashion as modern-day Protestant preachers may say -- without meaning it, and with the whole congregation's being aware that the preacher is deliberately faking (the congregation's being delighted at being entertained in so theatrical a manner) -- that they "hear and obey the voice of God"; and likewise in the very same fashion and intent, so did bye-gone royalty of antiquity. IN EXTREME CONTRAST, a real "schizophrenic" is so modest and so meek, so timid that such a person could never even think of taking control of an empire, nor of issuing imperious commands, nor ever of doing anything else of that ilk. [written 11 June 2017]}


{Was Julian Jaynes really so simple-minded that he could not distinguish contrived theatrics of Protestant preachers (and along with them the antient royalty whose antics they so entertainingly continuate); as against genuine mystic quietist-devotees (monastic recluses ofttimes canonized as "hagios" or "sanctus" 'saint' by the Catholic and/or Orthodox Church -- but who, in a non-cloistered non-religious saecular-world setting are usually certified "schizophrenic" and "committed" to the state-mandated "insane asylum")?}


pp. 101-2 but why not include, in that number, experiences experienced at the instant of awaking or of falling into sleep??

p. 101

"in 1983 Thomas Posey and then-graduate student Mary Losch published a study on auditory hallucinations


in the normal population,

{Do bear in mind that "non-normals" include everyone accused -- of "insanity" (such as, favoring liberal politics) by any ultra-reactionary (such as, pro-slavery Confoederate) employer, landlord, or landlady --, to any local social worker, who automatically will forward the complaint to the local police, who will automatically transport the accused to a state-operated "insane asylum", where every incoming victim is automatically "diagnosed" as "schizophrenic" by the psychiatrist-on-duty .}


reporting that roughly 70 percent of those sampled had experienced some type of brief auditory hallucination during wakefulness

{Do bear in mind that, however, among "non-normals" the percentage may be lower than this, inasmuch as persons committed to the insane asylum are usually victims of some ultra-reactionary plot aimed against all persons opposing slavery, against all pacifists, etc etc; because, liberal-minded "non-normals" are by far more mentally stable than the pro-slavery, foreigner-hating fanatics "normals" who accused them to the reactionary social worker, who consigned them to reactionary police, who delivered them to the crazed-fanatic psychiatrist.}


(hallucinations are

{We would suspect that these experiences were not included in the number because these experiences, when recorded for "non-normals", would demonstrate that mental stability is more praevalent among "non-normals" than among "normals".}

p. 102

known to be more common when one is just waking up or falling asleep -- these were not included in that number.)"


pp. 107-8 taken from Jaynes 1979 -- samples of a-few-of-the-many gross fallacies in Julian Jaynes's tendentious historical methodology

p. 107

"1. The cave paintings cannot be meant for ... ritual observance since they are usually located in he most most inaccessible positions inside caves.

{Why ought not S^lomoh's Heykal ('Temple')'s interior Qadows^ Qadowshiym 'Holy of Holies' (so inaccessible that it was entred only a single day each year), not likewise to be accounted as evidence that the religion of the TNaK cannot be "for ... ritual observance"?}


2. If they were drawn by artists in our sense, we would expect to find {where? in the interior of the palaiolithic aequivalent to a cathedral?!} preliminary attempts, as if learning to draw, but are not found.

{Why would the fact that "preliminary attempts, as if learning to draw, ... are not found" on the altar-pieces of mediaeval cathedrals in Europe, not likewise be accounted as evidence that the mediaeval altar-embellishers must not have been "artists in our sense"?}

p. 108

3. If drawn by artists in our sense {but, would such a sense include sorcerers employing artistic techniques of magical art?}, we would expect a homogeneity of skill regardless of subject, but they do not : ... the humans are almost entirely sticklike and not likenesses at all ... .

{The situation is praecisely as expected, if we merely understand (as most modern commentators already have) that the purpose of the cave-paintings was to bewitch/ensorcell hunted game-animals. Humans would not be accurately depicted in a ensorcellment-diagram, because, if such depictment were accurate, they too would (according to ensorcellment-suppositions) fall victim to the ensorcellment-magic.}


4. The most prominent reason to think ... these painting ... specfically as tracings of eidictic images is ... each animal is projected on the cave wall regardless of what was there in the first place. {But "eidetic images" never appear in the form of artistic images of beasts (instead, they are simple geometric figures, such as squiggles), whereas the cave-paintings' superposed images referred-to all are such (images of beasts).}

{By this method of Jaynes's, it could supposedly be proven (to his satisfaction and that of his followers) that, e.g., Feng-Shui specialist must be controlled by "eidetic images"; for, they too require (on account of "projected" calculations) that their clients station art-objects in peculiar places, regardless of whether those places would normally seem appropriate or not.}

Jaynes 1979 = Julian Jaynes : "Paleolithic Cave Paintings as Eidetic Images". BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN SCIENCES 2:605-7.


{It would be entirely possible that, after one beast was successfully hunted (in the world outside the cave), it might be decided that a particular cave-painting (already made, and on the wall) was responsible for that success; and thereupon, in order to stimulate further such prospective hunting-successes, a painting would be freshly made, superposed on the one reputedly already-successful-in-procuring-a-game-animal-in-hunting. [written 11 June 2017]}


pp. 110-1 signaling by bees {Do note that, according to Jaynes criteria, workers in the Signal Corps of the Army Corps of Engineers perform their work without resort to consciousness.}

p. 110

"In ... the round dance and the waggle dance, honey bee scouts convey the recommended location ... . ...

p. 111

But I think we {that is, Jaynes and his few fanatic followers} can agree it does not involve language as we {i.e., Jaynesians} understand it

{This variety of signaling is similar, not only to the sign-language used by Great-Plains tribes of North-AmerIndians, but also to the signal flags used (mostly formerly) both by ships at sea and by railways.}


or conscious thought as nearly everyone {or rather, nearly all deluded persons} would define it."

{It is an communicative activity at least as conscious (and conscientious as well) as are (or formerly were) the sign-language activities of North-AmerIndians (cf. the sign-language as yet commonly in use among dumb/speechless persons) and the signal-language activities of mariners and of railway-workers.}


p. 111 respectable scientists state do as a fact that insects are conscious

"The complex behavior of insects led Alun Anderson, Editor-in-Chief of the publication New Scientist, to proclaim that insects such as bees, butterflies, and cockroaches are "conscious" ... ."

Alun Anderson,

{This very pair of names proclaimeth authority concerning insects and flower-pollination. As for /ALUN/, the word /aluna/ 'uncut' (CDI-AL, p. 32a, # 720), which would most aptly apply to the blossom remaining uncut after the emmets had brought many cut blossoms, according to the Maya myth in the Popol Vuh. Therefore, (SW:"WhO") "In the Aluna dimensions, which are vast, the ... insects, play a major role, one mostly unbeknown to humans." More specifically, urgeth an "Aluna Temple" posting, "LET{'}S ... HELP BEES" ("LPThH"). As concerning /ANDERson/, */ANDHER/ is the very proto-Indo-Germanic etymon of the Hellenic word /anther/ 'pollen'.}

Editor-in-Chief of the publication New Scientist, to proclaim that insects such as bees, butterflies, and cockroaches are "conscious" ... ."

CDI-AL = R. L. Turner : A Comparative Dictionary of the Indo-Aryan Languages. School of Oriental and African Studies, 1966. https://books.google.com.au/books?id=UX_AeDYzhBQC&pg=PA32&lpg=PA32&dq=

SW:"WhO" = "White Owl". http://www.stuartwilde.com/2011/11/the-white-owl/

"LPThH" = "LETS PLANT THOSE HERBS ...". https://www.facebook.com/AlunaTemple/posts/775568319138939


{In Samskrta the word /rajas/ for 'dust' can also mean 'pollen'. And likewise, (NBAL, p. 198, n. 13) "pollen is the Latin word derived from palyn, a Greek word meaning dust." Because of the regular loss of initial /p-/ in Old Irish, this word could therein be repraesented by */ALUN/.}

NBAL = Ellen K. Moore : Navajo Beadwork : Architectures of Light. Univ of AZ Pr, Tucson, 2003. https://books.google.com.au/books?id=NH87h3CjuJAC&pg=PA198&lpg=PA198&dq=


p. 112 suddenness of emergence of insights

"the German physician Hermann von Helmholtz and the mathematician Carl Gauss, ... examples of scientists whose insights came to them "like a sudden flash of lightning," usually when they were no longer thinking about the problem" (Woodworth 1938).

Woodworth 1938 = R. Woodworth : Experimental Psychology. NY.


pp. 112-3 autonomic bodily processes {controlled by the thalamos of the brain : viz., by divine entities employing the thalamos of the material brain as portal-of-communication, into material world of powerless mortals, from subtle divine world of transcendent praeternatural power}

p. 112

"LeDoux [2002]writes that the unconscious

p. 113

processes include "... regulating heart rate, breathing rhythm, stomach contractions, and posture ... .""

LeDoux 2002 = Joseph LeDoux : Synaptic Self : ... Who We Are. Penguin Bks.


p. 113 apparent free will is apparently no more than a restrictive limitation {scil., on some praeternatural agency in charge of introducing (via subtle communicatory intraplane-portal stationed in our material brain) injunctions into our "subconscious" emotional field}

"No:rretranders [1999] ... describes experiments ... that show that brain activity occurs prior to the conscious awareness of making a decision -- with consciousness limited to deciding against carrying out behaviors initiated by the subconscious mind."

{It may well be that our free will is actually (without our being fully aware of this process) limited to vetoing recommendations for immediate action issued by our oversoul.}

No:rretranders 1999 = Tor No:rretranders : The User Illusion : Cutting Consciousness Down to Size. Penguin.


p. 113 analytic processing prior to and behind consciousness {is constantly being performed on our behalf by our divinely provided spirit-guides}

"Laughlin [1997, p. 23] notes that "analytical and integrative processing is occurring prior to and ... 'behind' the actual experience that is registered in consciousness." In this sense, intuitive reasoning can play an important ro[^]le in decision-makig and problem-solving."

Laughlin 1997 = Charles Laughlin : "The Nature of Intuition". In :- R. Davis-Floyd & P. S. Arvidson (edd.) : Intuition : the Inside Story. Routledge.


p. 114 veritable experiences "In absence of consciousness"? {How?!}

"In the absence of consciousness, the bicameral mind was a form of ... decision-making that provided solutions in the form of hallucinations ... ."

{But ... how could "hallucinations" be experienced (and if not experienced, how-on-earth could they be labeled as "hallucinations"?) in the "absence of consciousness"?! [This is all very muddled reasoning.]}


p. 115 allegation that the adventure-novel type of action in antient epics is proof of some weird hypothesis by a modern speculative authors taking such a genre of purely litterary (and probably originally intended mock-heroically, as a spoof on fake heroism) composition all too seriously

""in the Iliad ... the gods ... speak briefly in a forceful and clear command." The frequent admonitions of the gods in the Iliad are [Weissman 1993, p. 7] "convincing corroborations of Jaynes's theory.""

{Modern-day adventure-novels are replete with similar forceful action often praeceded by forceful commands (sometimes issued by a hero's or a heroine's "Will" or "Resolution" or "Conscience"). Any modern-day expositor of such novels could (by applying virtually identical criteria as applied by Julian Jaynes upon the Iliad) therefrom deduce that all modern-day persons are mindless, unconscious robots.}

Weissman 1993 = Judith Weissman : Of Two Minds : Poets Who Hear Voices. Hanover : Univ Pr of New England.


p. 121 "in diverse places and at sundry times" : renowned saintly artists who were divinely gifted with holy revelations from Heavenly angeloi and from other mighty supernaturals abiding in aeternal Transcendence

"James Thurber was blind by the age of 35 and experienced visual hallucinations that he incorporated into his work. [Ramachandran & Blakeslee 1998, pp. 85-7]

The English poet William Blake "insisted he could teach anyone to listen to and see angels as he did, angels from whom he heard his poetry" ... .

Geographers [Park, Simpson-Housley, and De Man 1994] ... provide ... the hallucination-inspired artwork of the famous Swedish ... artist Adolf Wolfi and his unusual perception of geography and space."

"English writer and occultist Aleister Crowley ... claims that ... his "Holy Guardian Angel" Aiwass dictated the Book of the Law to him. In his book The Equinox of the Gods, Crowley describes the event in detail, saying that as he sat at his desk the voice of Aiwass came from over his left shoulder ..., and "seemed to echo itself in my physical heart in a very strange manner ... ."

[quoted from Crowley 1936, cap. 7] "Of course I wrote them ...; but they are not my words, ... Aiwass ... being ... the Truth in the Book, ... possessed of all sorts of praeternatural knowledge and power."

Ramachandran & Blakeslee 1998 = V. S. Ramachandran & S. Blakeslee : Phantoms in the Brain : Probing the Mysteries of the Human Mind. NY : William Morrow & Co.

Park, Simpson-Housley, & De Man 1994 = Deborah C. Park, Paul Simpson-Housley, & Anton de Man : "To the 'Infinite Spaces of Creation' : the Interior Landscape of ... Artist". ANNALS OF THE ASSN OF AMER GEOGRAPHERS 84.2 (June):192-209.

Crowley 1936 = Aleister Crowley : The Equinox of the Gods.


p. 123 the divinely-gifted prophet Latter-Day Saint Joseph and his divinely-revelated holy gospel the Book of Mormon

"Joseph Smith ... continued to slip into

dissociated states,

{dissociated from the seductive delusion of the mere material world; but associated, instead, with the True World of divine Reality}

where he experienced visions of angels and auditory ... . Smith would bury his face in his {top}hat and stare at {viz., scrye into} a {semi-transparent peep}stone he had placed there ... ." (Morain 1998)

"Smith ...starting at the age of 14, ...

[quoted from Hansen 1981, pp. 21-2] "... retreated into a grove behind his father's farm, where ...

{This socially-sanctioned mode of religious "retreat" is often (as, in the context of Traditional AmerIndian religious practice,) described as a "vision-quaest".}

God the Father and Jesus Christ appeared to him in person."

{It is customary, among apparitional divinities, for them to label themselves in accordance with names already familiar to their mortal disciple.}

While Smith was in a dissociated state,

{dissociated from the worldly Spirit of Falsehood, but associated with the unworldly Spiri of Truth}

they replied to his question regarding which religious denominations were true."

{Their replies were, of course, similar to the replies which they had rendred to his father and to his grandfather under similar circumstances.}

Morain 1998 = William D. Morain : The Sword of Laban : Joseph Smith, Jr.

Hansen 1981 = Klaus Hansen : Mormonism and the American Experience. Univ of Chicago Pr.


p. 124 mentally constructed worlds are "not susceptible to falsification" : such is the impervious-to-mortal-influence nature of the divine Reality

[quoted from Elst 2002] "These hallucinations may be ... purely mental (being struck by sudden "insights" of enormous and unshakeable certainty, not susceptible to falsification by reality)." {By what so-called "reality"? There can be (comparatively) no meaningful Reality in the material universe, which is (comparatively) a disintegrative mass of delusions.}

{Dreams and visions are generally "not susceptible to falsification" in a similar sense as material-world theatre set-ups of prop-arrangements are not thus susceptible. Just as a material-world's stage-props are commonly re-arranged from-play-to-play, from-act-to-act, and from scene-to-scene, so likewise is (on a much grander scale, the re-arrangement being performed by mental teleportation, in which science the dream-deities are most expert) the landscape in a dream-world or in a vision-world.}

Elst 2002 = K. Elst : "Wahi : the Supernatural Basis of Islam". KASHMIR HERALD October. http://www.kashmir herald.com


p. 125 from what manner of divine apparitions did the world's religions innately arise?

"That the world's religions arose out .. hallucinated voices merits consideration." {Really?! Primitive tribesfolk are never quite that superfluously credulous!}

{More than mere divine voices heard while awake (the Heavenly context of the divine speakers not being sufficiently well-confirmable in such circumstances) or mere visionary apparitions (the Heavenly context of the divine speakers not being sufficiently well-confirmable in such circumstances), setting in Heaven itself would be required, with the deities/divinities not only both speaking and openly visible and able to be touched, would be required before that context could stand as sufficient evidence. This set of combined circumstances can occur only in dreaming, which is, therefore, the only possible original source of religions; as was recognized by various 19th-century (Chr.Aira) anthropologists.}

{"dreams first suggest the train of ideas which results in the religious explanation." (WGB:GR)} {"Out of dreams, therefore, evolved "the doctrine of ... spiritual beings in general," a doctrine that was "rational," [ER&N:DCh:"A", p. 79a] even ... was "a ... philosophy" ... "intense and inveterate ..."." [ER&N:DCh:"A", p. 79b]} {"Herbert Spencer ... found the origins of religion in ... reasoning about dreams" (RS:EGP:"OR", p. 258) : this theory he praesented (RS:EGP:"OR", p. 257) in his book "First Principles in 1862".}

WGB:GR = Willis George Banker : The Genesis of Religion. M.A. Thesis, Univ of Kansas, 1897. http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu

ER&N:BT:"A" = Bron Taylor (ed.) : ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION AND NATURE. Continuum, London & NY, 2005. pp. 78a-81a David Chidester : "Animism" (quoting somewhat from :- E. B. Tylor [1832-1917] : Animism). http://www.religionandnature.com/ern/sample/Chidester--Animism.pdf

RS:EGP:"OR" = RELIGIOUS STUDIES 1 (1966):257-61. E. G. Parrinder : "The Origins of Religion". https://www.jstor.org/stable/20004628?seq=2#page_scan_tab_contents


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Marcel Kuijsten (ed.) : Reflections on the Dawn of Consciousness : Julian Jaynes's Bicameral Mind Theory Revisited. Julian Jaynes Society, Henderson (NV), 2006.